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During the past decade, much has been said about the role that
on—the—job training plays in augmentingone's stock of human capital)
Up to this point, little has been done to distinguish the effect of
on—the—job training from that of aging on the increase in human wealth.
The reason rests primarily on the fact that it is difficult to observe
or even define in some appropriate way the amount of on—the—job training
that an individual possesses. In this paper, a method is developed by
which one may compare the effects of work experience to those of aging
per Se. The difference is then attributed to on—the—job training.
The analysis deals with the relationship between an individual's
wage growth pattern and his employment history. If, as the human
capital framework suggests, individuals increase their wealth by investing
in themselves in the form of on—the—job training, one might expect that
workers who spend less time on the job during a given period of time
would acquire less human capital. If so, individuals who work a smaller
proportion of time during say, a three year period, will experience less
rapid wage growth than individuals who work continuously throughout this
time. Thus, it is expected that the growth rate of wages will be
related not simply to an individual's chronological age, but also to
the amount of time spent on the job during the period under consideration.
If this is in fact the case, then part of the cost of being unemployed
takes the form of human capital foregone during the period. The total
cost of unemployment is then the sum of foregone earnings plus the value2
.
offoregone human capital. The majority of this paper will be devoted
to estimating the size of this effect.





whereW69 is the hourly wage rate in 1969in cents for individual i,
I
W66 is the hourly wage rate in 1966 in centsfor individual I,
is the average annual growth rate of wages which varies
across individuals,
A is a wage shift parameter unique to this three year period,
but invariant across individuals,
u1 is the random error termwhere uN(O, 2 I)
The growth rate, y., depends on a number of other parameters, the most
fundamental of which relate to aging and the acquisition of human capital.
Let us then start with
(2) y. = +a1(S60 — +ct,(OJT0 —0JT66
)
1 ¼) 1' '-'-'I i
whereS69is the highest grade of schooling completed in 1969 by
I
individual I,
S66is the highest grade of schooling completed in 1966 by
individual i,
0JT69
is the individual's stock of on—the—job training in 1969,
0JT66
is the individual's stock of on—the—job training in 1966 .
with'ct1,and 2 all positive3
reflects the effect of aging per se on wage growth while
a1
is the result of on—the—job training which would not be acquired were
the individual not at work.
Although the data to be used in this analysis are quite explicit
with respect to job experience, it still remains impossible to directly
measure with any confidence the amount of on—the—job training acquired
over this three year period. It is possible, however, to approximate
the change in the stock of on—the—job training if it is assumed that
(3) OJT —OJT =6(E —E )+6 E + 6 S + (S Age.
69i 1 69 66j 2 66 3 66 41
whereE69is the amount of job experience in 1969 for individual i,
I
E66is the initial amount of job experience in years held by
individual i,
Age1 is the individual's age in years in 1966.
and 63 are positive while S and are negative.
is expected to be positive since individuals who spend more
time working are more likely to acquire on—the—job training (this
essentially is the requirement that the cost of learning be a convex
function of the learning rate).2 62 should be negative since itpays
an individual who plans to invest in one—the—job training to do so during
his first years on the job. This means that as previous experience
increases, incremental investment In on—the—job training should fall.3
The sign of 63 depends upon the marginal complementarity or substitutability
of formal schooling and on—the—job training. If, as seems most likely,
formal schooling and on—the—job training are complements,63 will be4
.
positive.Finally, 64 is negative since older individuals are less
likely to invest in human capital.4
(E69 —E66)mayberewritten as (156—TN1)/52 where TN1 is
1 1
thetotal number of weeks during the three year period in which the









S66)+a2[61(3) 52' + 62E66 +63566 + 64Age.]
or
(6) =0+ 01S6 + 02E66 + 03(S69 —S66) + O4TN. + O5Age.














Substituting (6) into (1) and taking the log of both sides yields5
(7) in W69=inA + in W66 + 3°o + + 02E66 + 03(S69—S66)
+ O4TN + O5Age] + u.
or
(8) in —inW66
=n +riS66+ 2E66+ 113(S69 —S66) 1i 1 1
+
114TN. + n5Age. + u














=inA + 3a0 —i56(r4)
so that
(10) = — inA + i56(4)]/3.
Equation (iO) is not identified since we are unable to estimate
in A. However, since it is reasonabie that Ai, It must be the case6
.
that
(11) a0 < +
156(ri4)}/3
so that we can obtain an upper bound to the effect of aging on wage
growth.
Up to this point, onlyhuman capital variablesof themost traditional
types have been included in the wage growth equation. However, there are
reasons to expect that wage growth will depend on other factors as well.
In light of the work by Lindsay (1971), Mincer and Polachek (1974), and
Parsons (1974), it is reasonable to suppose that wage growth will be a
function of the change in the number of hours worked between 1966 and
1969. In addition, to the extent that military experience offers an
alternative method of acquiring human capital, the change in the amount
of military experience should be included. Finally, since there are
many reasons why blacks may have different incentives to invest in
on—the--job training than whites, race may be a factor in determining
wage growth. These variables are added to (8) so that it becomes
(12) in W69 —in = +fl1S66 + fl2E66 + 3(S69 —s66)
+ fl4TN1 + n5Age1 + + riD
+ ri8CM1 + ui
where D is a dummy variable set equal to 1 for white individuals,7
CH is the "usual" number of hours worked in 1969 minus the
"usual" number of hours worked in 1966,
CM is the number of years of military experience in 1969 minus
the number of years of military experience in 1966.
This equation can be easily estimated with longitudinal data
obtainable from the National Longitudinal Survey. The data selected for
this study was that pertaining to young men, 14 to 24 years old. The
reason is straightforward. Since we are trying to estimate the effect
of experience on wage growth, postulating that missed work time represents
missed on—the—job training, we would like to examine a group of
individuals who undertake substantial investment in human capital. Since
the young tend to invest most and since men invest in on—the—job training
more than do women, the desired effects are most likely to be observed
when looking at young men. The results should therefore be interpreted
in this light: The estimated effects will tend to be stronger for the
group in question than for the working population as a whole.
The original sample has records on 5,225 individuals. This had
to be reduced to 1,996 observations to meet the following criteria:
First, it was necessary for the purposes that individuals in the sample
have wage rates reported in both 1966 and 1969. Although this tended to
systematically throw out observations on younger individuals in the
sample, the mean age of those remaining was still 19.334 years. Second,
individuals who reported that their wage rate was either less than fifty
cents per hour or greater than ten dollars were dropped on the grounds
that reported wages in those cases were unlikely to be correct. Finally,
observations were dropped for which there was incomplete information on
variables used in this analysis.8
5 . Equation(12) was estimated by OLS.The results were:
(13) in W69 —in 1.0456 + .007537 S66 —.02204E66 (.1000) (.00625) (.00649)
+ .04106(S69—S66) —.0008853TN
(.0121) (.000277)
—.03125Age + .002772 CH
(.00644) (.000686)





(The figures enclosed in parentheses are standard errors.)
The equation yields a number of interesting results. First, the
coefficient on TN is negative and significant. This is consistent with
the theory. Individuals who spend less time in the work forceacquire
less human capital in the form of on—the—job training. Since this
equation holds formal schooling constant, this coefficient is not biased
by the substitution of formal schooling for on—the--job training during
the non—worked period. The term reflects the net foregone investment in
human capital associated with dropping out of the work force.6
The coefficients are more easily interpreted when converted by
the following computation: Taking the anti—log of (12), wemay write
+ + rE66+ ...+
p8CM) (14) =
W66e9












for a white worker who was not in the military between 1966 and 1969.
(All other variables assume their mean values.)
Equation (16) implies that being out of the work force for a
period of one additional year between 1966 and 1969 will cost the
individual 14.3 per hour in lower wages in 1969. The following calculation
reveals this to be a substantial loss.
Suppose the individual in question missed work during 1968—69.
Let us make the optimistic assumption that he catches up with his otherwise
expected wage rate after five years, I.e., four years after re—entering
the work force. During those four years, he loses l4.3Q per hour for
each hour worked. The present value of the human capital loss to an





If r =10%,expression (17) is equal to $l,O84.l7.10
.
Whencomputingthe cost of a given amount of unemployment, one
should add to foregone earnings the value of the foregone human capital.
The foregone earnings associated with being unemployed during 1968—69 can
be estimated for this individual. If










Foregone earnings associated with missing 1968—69 then amount to
2000($2.686) or $5,372.
Given the assumptions, the cost of foregone human capital amounts
to about one—fifth the cost of foregone earnings associated with being
out of work. This amount is not insignificant, especially when it is
remembered that a relatively short catch—up period was assumed and that
the costs of catching up were assumed to be zero. If, at the other
extreme, one were to assume that the individual never catches up, the
present value of the human capital loss would be $2,860, or over one—half
the amount of foregone earnings.8
These results are important in that they reveal the existence of
an experience effect. Work experience (or its complement) is related to11
wage growth independent of aging. Individuals who spend tre time at
work over the three year period seem to experience more rapid wage growth
which, it may be inferred, reflects on—the—job training.(This, of
course, holds other types of human capital acquisition such as formal
schooling constant.)
It must be pointed out, however, that the effect of experience
on wage growth is much smaller than the upper bound of the aging effect.
















wherethe second term on the right hand side of (21) is the effect of






3W —3W69 Since 3(worng) =TN
=.2749,one year of experience implies a
14.3 increase in wages. The upper bound of the effect of aging is
therefore about six times as large as that of work experience per se.
Part of this difference may be attributed to a measurement bias.
Since older individuals are less likely to invest in on—the—job training
than are their younger counterparts, the observed wage understates the12
.
truewage (which includes compensation in the form of human capital) by
a greater amount for younger individuals than it does for older ones.
If so, a portion of the observed returns to aging would be illusory,
resulting from this systematic bias in observed wages.
The last few paragraphs should not be taken to imply that
experience is unimportant. It is clear that aging is important and
understandably so for individuals in the 14 to 24 year old age group.
However, aging is parametric whereas experience is not. Experience has
been shown to be important both in an absolute sense and relative to
current wages. The fact that the effect of aging is so pronounced for
the group in question is an interesting and useful result; it does not,
however, negate the importance of the experience effect.
It should be noted that the effect of experience on wage growth
is not analytically the same as the effect of previous experience on
wage growth. The effect of the former as reflected by the TN coefficient
represents the amount by which wages increase with additional work
experience in the current period. The latter relates to the rate at
which individuals will acquire on—the—job training in the current period
for each unit of current experience. It was anticipated that individuals
with a greater amount of previous experience would invest in less
on—the—job training during the current period since it (generally) pays
to invest in larger amounts of training during the initial years of work.
The coefficient on E66 bears this out.
This also sheds light On the question of neutrality. If the
rental price of human capital were constant over all units of human
capital once age were given,9 and If the marginal cost of human capital13
were not a function of previous investment (i.e., Ben—Porath's neutrality
assumption), the effect of previous experience on the (absolute) change
in wages would be zero. More simply, if neither the marginal cost nor
marginal return to investment in human capital varies with previous
experience, there is no reason for the experienced worker to behave
differently from the unexperienced one. The wage growth behavior of
both individuals would be expected to be the same. The fact that
experience does have a negative effect on (in W69 —inW66) implies that
the neutrality assumption is invalid or that retirement (or more generally,
length of time in the labor force) is a function of experience. From






(In the context of this question, W66 is a parameter. We are interested
in the effect of previous experience on wage growth between 1966 and
1969, given wages in 1966 rather than the total effect of previous
experience on wage growth which includes the effect of E66 on W66.) Then
differentiating with respect to E66 yields
(W69 —W66)
+ ...+
ri8CM) ____ (25) =
W66[e ]n2 66 66
This expression is necessarily negative since <0.
The negative effect of previous experience on inferred investment
in on—the—job training Implies that one of two situations holds: On the
one hand, It may be the case that the retirement age (or the amount of14
.
futuretime to be spent working) is a function of past experience with
this age falling as previous experience increases. This reduces the
returns to investment in human capital and decreases the optimal amount
of on—the—job training purchased. It is unlikely, however, that this
can account for much of the effect since the retirement date for these
individuals is expected to occur about forty years hence.
The alternative explanation is provided by relaxing the neutrality
assumption. If previous investment in on—the—job training affects the
productivity of time spent working by more than it affects the productivity
of time spent in the production of human capital, then the marginal cost
of a unit of human capital rises as experience rises. Thus, given age,
individuals with more previous experience enjoy less rapid wage growth
over the period.10
Age enters negatively and significantly and the coefficient is
of roughly the same magnitude as that on previous experience. However,
since the date of retirement occurs so far in the future, it is unreasonable
to infer that the age coefficient reflects the difference in marginal
returns to investment in human capital across individuals. Two
explanations seem more plausible. First, as pointed out above, aging
is an important component in the determination of wage growth. It is
reasonable to suppose that aging matters more for younger workers than
for older ones since both physical and emotional maturity appear to be
concave functions of time. If so, the age coefficient is essentially an
interaction relationship between aging and age. Second, one may attribute
the negative age effect to a quality component not held constant by the
included variables. That is, a 24—year old who has the same amount of S15
work experience as an 18—year old obviously uses his time differently.
If past work history is correlated with future labor force behavior, the
older individual has a lower probability of being employed throughout
the full year than does the younger one. The age coefficient then not
only picks up the effect of age per Se, but also the desire to spend a
smaller proportion of each working year at the job.
The coefficient on incremental schooling is positive and
significant. As I have argued elsewhere,11 this should not be interpreted
as a rate of return to education, but simply as the average effect of
schooling on wage growth over this three year period. It is, however,
interesting to ask what the net effect is of dropping out of the labor






TO is non—school time not worked and the school year is assumed





where the expression on the left hand side is the gross—partial associated














where (.0158) is the standard error computed from the variance—covariance
matrix.
Attending school Is then slightly more productive in terms of
wage growth than is on—the—job training. This is as it should be since
the costs associated with the former are larger than those associated
with the latter. In fact, the difference between the twomay appear
to be too small. This can be explained by the fact that the estimates
relate to the average rather than marginal effects over the threeyear
period. If the ratio of average to marginal effects of schooling are
less than the ratio of average to marginal effects of on—the—job
training, then the estimate of the schooling effect overstates the
marginal schooling effect by less than the estimate of the on—the—job
training effect overstates the marginal on—the—job training effect.
Under circumstances where the effect of schooling (on—the—job training)
on the difference In the log of wages was a negative, convex function
of previous schooling (on—the—job training), this would be the expected
result since individuals in this group are at relatively high levels of
formal schooling, but at low levels of on—the—job training.
As anticipated, an Increase in the number of hours per week
worked has a positive effect on wage growth. The partial effect is
W69 (r0 + +
(29)CH W66[e In6= .8606
so that increasing average weekly hours by 20 (I.e., moving from the
typical part—time to the typical full—time job) increases wages In 1969
by about 17C per hour.17
One rather interesting result is that, ceteris paribus, white
workers experienced less rapid wage growth over this period than did
black workers. This probably reflects the fact that 1966—69 witnessed
rather significant change in the institutional structure, one of the
results of which was a narrowing of the black—white differential.12 The
signalling hypothesis provides another explanation)3 It may be the
case that blacks with equal schooling and job experience as whites may
be seif—selectingly higher quality workers than are the corresponding
whites. Employers who fail to discriminate in their reading of signals
at the time of hiring will tend to pay the higher quality non—whites the
same wage as the lower quality white workers. Over time, however,
employers learn about the non—white's relative advantages and the non—white
worker's wages increase accordingly.(This would not be expected to
persist over time, though, since employers who discriminated In favor of
non—whites with equal schooling and experience at the time of hiring
would drive their less efficient competitors out of business.)
Finally, the coefficient on incremental military experience is
positive and of roughly the same magnitude as incremental schooling.
The standard error here is large, probably because only 52 out of 1,996
individuals had a non—zero value for this variable. To the extent that
the estimate is taken to be close to the true value, it appears as though
one year in the military contributes as much to the stock of human
capital as one year of formal schooling.18
.
Summaryand Conclusions
This paper has been an attempt to distinguish between the effects
of experience and age in the formation of human capital.By asking
"What is the cost in foregone human capital associated withnot working?"
we have obtained estimates of the age—experience differential. The major
findings were:
1. The effect of current work experience onwage growth is
substantial. Under reasonable assumptions, anywhere from one—sixth to
one—third of the total cost of unemployment consists of the value of
foregone human capital.
2. For individuals in the 14—24 year—old agegroup, aging is
the most important factor in the determination ofwage growth. It should
be remembered, however, that aging is not an economic variable which is
subject to choice.
3. The finding that wage growth is inversely related to previous
work experiences casts serious doubt on the validity of theneutrality
assumption. Since this assumption is almost universal throughout the
age—earnings literature, this result should cause some concern.
4. As expected, an increase in formal schooling is associated
with more rapid wage growth. It is also found that schooling increases
wage growth by slightly more than does the equivalent amount of work
experience.
5. Consistent with previous work, we find that an increase in
the number of hours worked implies more rapidwage growth.
6. It appears that, ceteris paribus, non—whites enjoyedmore
rapid wage growth over the period in question than did whites. This19
may be the result of institutional changes or of unobserved quality
differences at the time of hiring which work in favor of white workers.
The main conclusion of this study is that it is a serious mistake
to treat "age" and "experience" as two names for the same phenomenon.
Investigators are likely to be misled by a grouping which fails to
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1. See, for example, Blau and Duncan (1967), Chiswick (1974),
Hause (1973), Heckinan (1974), Lillard (1974), Michael and Lazear (1971),
Mincer (1962, 1974), Mincer and Polachek (1974), and Rosen (1973).
2.See Lazear (1974) and Rosen (1973) for a more complete
discussion of this issue.
3. This is the usual result of an optimal investment plan ina
life—cycle context. Both Ben—Porath (1967) and Rosen (1972) derive this
implication. Heckman (1974) and Mincer and Polachek (1974), on the
other hand, show that under reasonable assumptions this result willnot
hold.
4. is the effect of age on the acquisition of on—the—job
training. It should not be confused witha0 which is the effect of
aging on the stock of human capital and therefore on wage growth.
5. By hypothesizing that the change in hours worked enters the
wage change equation we introduce simultaneity bias. The wage growth
equation writes wage growth as a function of the change in hours. The
supply of labor, however, would relate hours worked to wages and thus
change in hours worked to the change in wages. Because of this, OLS
yields biased estimates of the effects. The reader may be somewhat
reassured to learn that when the CH term was deleted from theequation,21
none of the remaining coefficients were significantly altered.(See the
appendix for additional discussion of this issue.)
The same argument does not, however, hold for the TN coefficient.
It can be argued that individuals with lower wage rates and/or higher
wealth will tend to work fewer hours. This does not apply for the change
in wage rates, however, since there is no reason to believe that
individuals who have experienced large wage increases have either low
wages or high wealth.
6. It might be argued that this coefficient is a reflection of
differences in ability rather than in human capital stock levels. An
attempt was made to standardize for the component of ability not held
constant by inclusion of schooling, previous experience and age. The
NLS has information on virtually every individual In the sample which
gives their test scores on an examination which was designed to test
their "knowledge of the world of work." (Similar information was not
available on IQ.) If this can be considered a proxy for ability,
inclusion of this variable into equation (12) should affect the TN
coefficient if the ability argument were correct. Estimation of this
equation yielded results which were virtually identical in all respects
to equation (13). In particular, the coefficient on the ability proxy
was insignificant. (See the appendix regression #2 for complete results.)
7. If foregone human capital affects non—market productivity as
well as market productivity, this present value calculation will tend to
understate the loss associated with unemployment. It is not likely
that this understatement will be significant, however, since on—the—job
training tends to be market specific in the type of human capital it
provides.22
.
8.If Ben—Porath's assumption of neutrality were correct, there
would be no reason to engage in any type of catch—up behavior. The
marginal cost of human capital would be independent of whether 1968—69
were worked or not. As long as the date of retirement is not significantly
altered, the marginal return to a unit of human capital would be left
unchanged as well so that there would be no reason to alter the optimal
investment plan.
9. This amounts to assuming that retirement is a function of
age alone and is independent of the amount of time spent working over
the lifetime. In light of the work done by Bowen and Finegan (1969)
which shows that labor force participation tends to vary positively
with the level of education for older workers, it is unlikely that the
assumption is a valid one. S
10. See Brown (1974) for a more detailed discussion of the
neutrality question.
11. See Lazear (1974).
12. See Welch (1974) for additional evidence on this point.
13. See Arrow (1972) and Spence (1972) for a more complete
discussion of the signalling hypothesis.
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APPENDIX
Onemay formulate a simple system of simultaneous equations
which treats hours worked as endogenous. Suppose
(A.l) 1169 = + a1(lnW69) +a2(A69)
and




—a)+ a1(ln W69 —inW66) + a2(A69 —A66)
whereH66 is hours worked in 1966,
1169 is hours worked in 1969,
A66 is wealth in 1966, and
A69 is wealth in 1969.
Since wealth Is a lifetime concept, if expectations about lifetime
earnings between 1966 and 1969 do not change, (A69 —A66)should equal




wherey is the individual's income level and Y is the median income for
individuals in his occupation. The notion is that if the Individual's
income increases more rapidly than does the occupation's income, he has26
.
enjoyeda windfall gain.(Since the sample consists of young workers,
the average increase in individual income will exceed that ofoccupational
income. This, however, will be netted out by the constant term.)
Appendix regression equation #4 contains the results of estimation
by 2SLS. CH is taken to be endogenous and fitted values obtained from
the regression on exogenous variables replace actual values.
The results of the two stage regression differ substantially
from the estimates obtained by OLS. In the twostage equation, the only
variable that matters is CII. None of the other coefficients differ
significantly from zero. The explanation is straightforward: The variable
which is excluded to identify the equation is CA. CA is a transofrmation
of the change in income which for the group in question ishighly
correlated with the change in wages. Since the dependent variable is the
change in the log of wages, it is not surprising that CH which uses CA
as an instrument in its construction is highly correlated with the
dependent variable. This explains the fact that its coefficient Is about
twenty times its size in the OLS regression and is the only significant
variable in the two stage regression.
Note, however, that when the CII term is deleted in regression #3,
none of the remaining coefficients differ significantly from those obtained
in regression #1.
.27
Table 1. Table of supplementary regressions.
Variable Regression #1 Regression #2 Regression #3 Regression #4
S66 .006021 .005258 .007070 —.008973
(.006342) (.007037) (.006361) (.01235)
E66 —.023337 —.023432 —.024276 —.005016
(.006525) (.006538) (.006546) (.01279)
Age —.030201 —.030374 —.033845 .02962
(.006472) (.006511) (.006432) (.02104)
CII .002745 .002747 .04929
(.000685) (.000685) (.01342)
S —s .040392 .039998 .041849 .001604 69 66
(.012142) (.012225) (.012183) (.002323)
CM .05i488 .051326 .070562 —.2713
(.11323) (.11326) (.11356) (.2266)
TN —.000891 .000893 .000974 .0005297
(.000277) (.000277) (.000277) (.0006481)
D —.059472 —.061697 —.059995 —.04833






Constant 1.0465 1.0469 1.1157 —.1294
(.1001) (.1001) (.0990) (.3828
R2 .129 .129 .122 N/A
SEE .4432 .4432 .4448 .8081
F 36.7 32.6 39.4 N/A
SSR 388.87 388.86 392.02 1297.5
Method of
estimationOLS OLS OLS 2SLS
No. of ob-
servations1989 1989 1989 1996